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Abstract
State owned tobacco monopolies, which still account for 40% of global cigarette production, face
continued pressure from, among others, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to be privatised.
This review of available literature on tobacco industry privatisation suggests that any economic
benefits of privatisation may be lower than supposed because private owners avoid competitive
tenders (thus underpaying for assets), negotiate lengthy tax holidays and are complicit in the
smuggling of cigarettes to avoid import and excise duties. It outlines how privatisation leads to
increased marketing, more effective distribution and lower prices, creating additional demand for
cigarettes among new and existing smokers, leading to increased cigarette consumption, higher
smoking prevalence and lower age of smoking initiation. Privatisation also weakens tobacco
control because private owners, in their drive for profits, lobby aggressively against effective
policies and ignore or overturn existing policies.
This evidence suggests that further tobacco industry privatisation is likely to increase smoking and
that instead of transferring assets from state to private ownership, alternative models of supply
should be explored.
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Introduction
The increase in global smoking rates is attributable in large part to the spread of
transnational tobacco companies (TTCs). TTCs enter new markets in two main ways: by
exporting to the market (facilitated by trade liberalisation) or by producing in the market -
through foreign direct investment (FDI) and privatisation of state owned tobacco
monopolies (SOTMs), made possible as a result of investment liberalisation (McCorriston
2000).
Studies of the forced opening of four Asian cigarette markets to American cigarette exports
in the 1980s indicate that removing barriers to trade leads to higher cigarette consumption
by increasing competition, which drives marketing activity up and prices down (Taylor and
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Chaloupka 2000). By contrast, there has been less research on investment liberalisation and
privatisation of SOTMs.
Numerous SOTMs have been privatised in recent years, sometimes as a result of
International Monetary Fund (IMF) pressure (Weissman and White 2002). Despite the
uniquely damaging nature of tobacco, the IMF appears to apply the same rationale to
privatisation of tobacco and other industries (Gilmore, A. et al. 2009), even though staff
have acknowledged in private that privatisation will likely increase competition, reduce
costs and increase marketing – all likely to stimulate cigarette consumption (personal
correspondence IMF staff member, October 2005). The IMF’s response has been to
advocate tax increases, at best only a partial response, and one to which countries do not
seem to have paid much attention (Stuckler et al. 2010). IMF staff and supporters of tobacco
industry privatisation instead argue, in line with economic concepts, that governments no
longer directly engaged in selling tobacco will be more likely to adopt effective tobacco
control measures (personal correspondence IMF staff member, October 2005) (Chaloupka
and Nair 2000b).
Although the Chinese tobacco monopoly is by far the largest, state owned tobacco
companies remain common in many parts of the world (Mackay and Erikson 2002, Yurekli
and De Beyer 2002), accounting for an estimated 40% of world cigarette consumption
(Mackay and Erikson 2002). The pressure to privatise these entities makes it essential to
understand the potential impacts. Presently, what is known about privatisation is contained
in isolated case studies making it difficult to assess overall effects. This paper addresses this
issue by reviewing the existing evidence on the impacts of FDI in and privatisation of state
owned tobacco manufacturing assets.
Background
Privatisation
Privatisation is defined here as the deliberate sale by a government of state-owned
enterprises or assets to private economic agents. By the early 1990s the belief that publicly
owned assets would perform more efficiently in private ownership was a core component of
the macroeconomic reforms exported globally by the World Bank and IMF despite a marked
absence, at the time, of evidence of the impacts of privatisation (Stiglitz 2002).
Evidence emerging subsequently shows that private firms outperform state owned
enterprises in efficiency and profitability and that privatisation leads mostly to
improvements in operating and financial performance (Megginson and Netter 1998, Nellis
1999). While most evidence comes from high income countries, some multi-country surveys
and individual studies from low and middle income countries reach similar conclusions
(Boubraki and Cosset 1998, Nellis 1999). The limitations of the evidence must however be
considered. First, there may be selection bias as better performing firms are more likely to
be privatised. Second, privatisation may appear to increase efficiency because it occurs
contemporaneously with deregulation or competition enhancement (Nellis 1999). Third,
most studies examine impacts at the level of the enterprise with few considering the wider
societal impacts, including on workers, the environment, the distribution of wealth and
health (Nellis 1999, Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids 2005)or economic growth
(Havrylyshyn and McGettigan 1999a). Finally, studies from the former Soviet Union (FSU)
show few benefits and it appears that benefits of privatisation decline in the less developed
parts of this region, consistent with evidence that privatisation is more likely to go wrong in
poorer countries (Nellis 1999, Cook and Unchida 2001).
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Privatisation post communism
When communism collapsed around 1990, privatisation was a key part of the economic
reforms promoted by the IMF and others (IMF 1991, Havrylyshyn and McGettigan 1999b).
The recommended ‘shock therapy’ approach of rapid privatisation assumed that
implementation of competitive policies and institutional safeguards could follow
privatisation (Sachs 1992, Lavigne 2000, Stiglitz 2002). But the failure of these economic
reforms was catastrophic. In Russia, for example, GDP in 2000 was less than two-thirds that
of a decade earlier and the proportion of the population living in poverty increased from 2%
to 24% between 1989 and 1998 (Stiglitz 2002). A large cross-national study found that the
extent of mass privatisation was significantly associated with increased adult mortality
(Stuckler et al. 2009).
Subsequent re-assessments have led IMF and World Bank officials to acknowledge that
privatisation failed in the FSU, although this failure has largely been attributed to the context
of privatisation, notably weak and corrupt governments and under-developed institutional
structures (Havrylyshyn and McGettigan 1999a, Havrylyshyn and McGettigan 1999b, Nellis
1999), while the role that corporations may have played has been largely overlooked
(Gilmore, A.B. et al. 2007b).
Methodology
An initial review of the literature on the impacts of privatisating tobacco manufacturing
industries was conducted in February 2007. Medline and Embase databases were searched
using the terms privatisation/privatization, market opening, trade liberalisation/liberalization
and market liberalisation/liberalization, combined with ‘tobacco industry’ or ‘tobacco’.
Google searches were performed and experts working the subject area or in countries where
tobacco privatisation had occurred, were contacted to obtain any grey literature. Appropriate
citations from the literature identified were also obtained. The searches of Medline and
Embase were updated in August 2010.
The review focused on both the economic impacts of privatising tobacco manufacturing
assets (examining evidence of effects on government revenue, market competition,
employment and trade) and also its impacts on public health (changes in cigarette marketing
and price, tobacco control policy and finally cigarette consumption and smoking
prevalence).
The literature identified primarily covered transition economies in Europe and Eurasia (the
FSU countries and Hungary), although some studies addressed privatisation/FDI in Austria,
Turkey and Cambodia. Exploring the effects of privatisation in Turkey (February 2008)
raises different issues to elsewhere as the privatisation of Tekel, the SOTM, agreed in
February 2008 (Attwood 2008), was preceded by 16 years of investment liberalisation
(Weissman and White 2002, Yurekli and De Beyer 2002). Papers focusing on the impacts of
trade liberalisation (in Thailand, Japan, Taiwan and Korea), including those where
privatisation and trade liberalisation almost coincided and thus the two impacts could not be
disentangled, were excluded from the review (e.g. Sato et al. 2000, Hsu et al. 2005; Wen et
al. 2006, Lee et al. 2009). For the same reason, data on Austria, where privatisation (in
1997) followed EU accession (1995) and thus trade liberalisation, were excluded (Bachinger
2004). Other countries known to have undergone privatisation did not feature in the
literature and could not therefore be included in the review. In total 24 peer reviewed
research papers were included, one thesis (with a second one excluded), five published
reports, three book chapters, one unpublished report and one World Bank briefing.
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To assess the extent to which the literature is representative of tobacco industry
privatisations we also obtained information on privatisations of state owned tobacco
manufacturers undertaken since 1991 (see Table 1). This involved searching the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency’s FDI database (http://www.fdi.net), Euromonitor
(http://www.euromonitor.com), industry press releases, rulings of competition authorities,
company web-sites, industry documents, trade journals, newspaper articles, academic
reports, and WHO publications. We also acquired data directly from Ministries of Finance,
tobacco control advocates and academics. Given that the impact of FDI/privatisation will
likely depend on the extent of change in the tobacco market engendered through the
privatisation process (i.e. the degree of change in share ownership), we used the same
sources to obtain information on market share immediately prior to privatisation in order to
assess whether the enterprise being sold had a leading share of the cigarette market.
Although our searches aimed to uncover all tobacco industry privatisation, for simplicity and
because this was consistent with the literature identified above (which focused almost
exclusively on the impact of privatising cigarette manufacturing assets), we include in Table
1 only those privatisations involving cigarette manufacturing1. The data indicate that the
studies included in our review cover 15 of the 37 countries in which privatisation has taken
place since 1991 and focus predominantly on countries where the industry being privatised
had a leading market share (covering 11 out of 25 of these countries) or where the market
share was unknown (three countries); the only exception being Turkey where, as a result of
the preceding investment liberalisation, by the time the SOTM was sold it no longer had a
leading market share. The fact that the literature obtained focused heavily on countries in the
FSU and Eastern Europe largely reflects the fact that most tobacco industry privatisations
occurred in this region.
Results
Macro-economic impacts of tobacco industry privatisation
Contribution to FDI and government revenue—Evidence from the FSU suggests that
tobacco industry privatisation can generate significant revenue for governments (Gilmore,
A.B. and McKee 2004c). In the FSU as a whole the TTCs invested over US$2.7billion over
the period 1992 to 2000 with the contribution of these tobacco investments to total FDI
varying widely by country, from around 1% to over 30% in Uzbekistan where British
American Tobacco (BAT) remains the largest investor (Gilmore, A.B. and McKee 2004c).
Nevertheless it appears that the revenues generated in the short-term from the sale of state
owned assets (Deloitte and Touche 2002) and in the longer term through various tax
revenues, were less than anticipated for a number of reasons. For example, TTCs have
actively sought to limit the prices paid for SOTMs by preventing competitive tenders
(Gilmore, A.B. and McKee 2004b, Gilmore, A.B. et al. 2007b), have negotiated highly
favourable tax treatment (tax holidays, notably profit tax holidays, were, for example,
obtained in Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Hungary and Kyrgyzstan) (Deloitte and Touche 2002,
World Bank 2005, Gilmore, A.B. et al.2007b) and, by their complicity in large scale
smuggling operations to avoid import and excise duties and lobbying to reduce excise rates
(see below), have further reduced government revenues (Gilmore, A.B. and McKee 2004a).
Smuggling also undermines local firms, which can then be acquired more cheaply (Shepherd
1985).
Although much of this evidence comes from the FSU, other research suggests BAT was able
to negotiate similar investment incentives in Cambodia, thus reducing the cost of its
investment (McKenzie et al. 2004).
1In reality this led only to the exclusion of a few smaller privatisations such as those of leaf processing units.
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Competition
Competition is generally assumed to be an inevitable consequence of privatisation. Yet TTC
influence appears to limit the extent to which privatisation produces competitive markets
(Gilmore, A.B. and McKee 2004c, McKenzie et al. 2004, Gilmore, A.B. et al. 2005, World
Bank 2005, Gilmore, A.B. et al. 2007b). In the five FSU countries, for example,
manufacturing monopolies were established post-privatisation and a de facto monopoly
established elsewhere despite other companies investing (Gilmore, A.B. and McKee 2004c).
One reason is that TTCs use their political influence actively to shape their operating
environment. Reemtsma (now part of Imperial Tobacco), for example, obtained an
undertaking from the Kyrgyzstan government that it would be the sole domestic producer of
cigarettes (World Bank 2005). In Uzbekistan, BAT established a manufacturing monopoly
and constrained both domestic and external competition through various routes including
absorbing potential internal competitors, securing exclusive rights to manufacture, erecting
barriers to market entry and establishing exclusive deals with local distributors, whilst
simultaneously negotiating exclusion from the monopolies committee (Gilmore, A.B. et al.
2007b).
Yet, regardless of the underlying market structure emerging post-privatisation, TTCs have
acted, in terms of their marketing practices, as though operating within a competitive
environment, as explored further below.
Employment in the tobacco sector
As might be expected given that capital investment increases labour productivity, Ukrainian
data show that total tobacco industry employment fell between 1995 and 2000 (the first TTC
investment was in 1992), with falls concentrated in privately owned factories(Krasovsky et
al. 2002) despite marked increases in output (Yurekli and De Beyer, 2002). This pattern is
replicated in Turkey and Poland (Yurekli and De Beyer 2002, Zatonksi 2003). There is also
evidence of worsening employment conditions among cigarette factory workers (Krasovsky
et al. 2002) and tobacco farmers (British Helsinki Human Rights Group 2002). While it is
possible that increased employment in sales and marketing might offset declines in
manufacturing, this has not been examined.
Cigarette production and tobacco trade
Analysis of data from the FSU and Turkey indicates that FDI transforms the economics of
cigarette production and trade (Yurekli and De Beyer 2002, Gilmore, A.B. and McKee
2005). Cigarette production capacity in FSU factories receiving private investment tripled
following investment. As most factories operated well below capacity pre-investment, actual
increases in production were likely to be far higher (Gilmore, A.B. and McKee 2004c). This
is supported by data showing the largest increases in production where TTCs had invested: a
96% increase between 1991 and 2000 in the seven FSU countries that received investment
prior to 1997 compared with just 11% in those without investment by 20002 (see Figure 1)
(Gilmore, A.B. and McKee 2005). In Ukraine, increased production was seen exclusively
within the privatised factories (Krasovsky et al. 2002) while in Turkey the increase post
1992 was more marked in private producers (Yurekli and De Beyer 2002).
Significantly, in the FSU, the only region where this has been examined, the massive growth
in production had little impact on the balance of trade as most of the increase was consumed
locally (see below), leaving little surplus for export. Although exports increased through the
2Thus excluding three countries where investment occurred after 1997 – considered too soon to have had an observable impact.
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1990s, imports still substantially outweigh exports by around 2.5 to 1 across the region
(Gilmore, A.B. and McKee, 2005).
The rapid increase in cigarette production and the shift in output from local (based on locally
grown leaf) to international cigarettes (largely requiring forms of tobacco leaf not grown
locally) has led to massive increases in leaf imports in countries receiving TTC investments
(see Figure 2) (Gilmore, A.B. and McKee 2005) and a fall in local leaf production to below
levels seen in the Soviet era (Gilmore, A.B. and McKee 2005). As a result, the regional trade
deficit in tobacco leaf increased ten-fold between 1992 and 1999 (Gilmore, A.B. and McKee
2005). This challenges the TTC’s claims that privatisation would improve tobacco leaf
agriculture and lead to leaf import substitution (Gilmore, A.B. and McKee 2004b) and, at
least in Poland, this contributed to a decline in agricultural employment (Zatonksi 2003).
The only work so far on the economic implications of these changes suggests that between
1996 and 2000 in Ukraine, the cost of tobacco imports exceeded export earnings by US$525
million, US$100 million more than tobacco excise revenue for the same period. Although
the balance has improved since 1999, the trade deficit remains substantial (Krasovsky et al.
2002).
Public health impacts of tobacco industry privatisation
Marketing practices
SOTMs do not traditionally market their products actively as their monopoly position makes
it unnecessary, although some also face legal restrictions on tobacco advertising.
Overwhelming evidence from every country where this issue has been examined, including
most of the FSU, Hungary, Poland and Cambodia, shows that privatisation produced
fundamental changes in the marketing environment. The TTCs launched massive cigarette
marketing campaigns and were consistently ranked among the top advertisers in all
countries with available data (Zatonksi 2003, Gilmore, A.B. and McKee 2004c, McKenzie
et al. 2004), targeted key groups – women, young people, those living in the cities, and
opinion leaders (Szilagyi and Chapman 2003a, Gilmore, A.B. and McKee 2004a, McKenzie
et al. 2004, Gilmore, A.B. et al. 2005, Le Gresley et al. 2006, Perlman et al. 2007) -- and
flaunted or overturned marketing restrictions (Krasovsky 1998, Szilagyi and Chapman
2003a, Zatonksi 2003, Gilmore, A.B. and McKee 2004c, McKenzie et al. 2004, Szilagyi and
Chapman 2004, Gilmore, A.B. et al. 2006, Le Gresley et al. 2006). In 1995 in Hungary, for
example, the Consumer Protection Agency (CPA) found cigarette producers had violated
tobacco advertising bans in almost all media (Szilagyi and Chapman 2003a).
The TTC’s own documents show that their underlying aim was to expand the market by
driving up consumption and increasing the number of new smokers (Szilagyi and Chapman
2003a, Gilmore, A.B. and McKee 2004a, Szilagyi and Chapman 2004, Gilmore, A.B. et al.
2005, Gilmore, A.B. et al. 2006). The ambitious targets the TTCs set themselves, which
were predicated on having no advertising restrictions (Szilagyi and Chapman 2003a,
Gilmore, A.B. and McKee 2004a, Gilmore, A.B. et al. 2006), and included, for example, a
45% increase in consumption in Uzbekistan to be achieved between 1993 and 1999
(Gilmore, A.B. et al. 2006), appear to have been reasonably accurate given the subsequent
trends in consumption (explored below).
Similarly, FDI by the TTCs in Turkey was (according to work by both the World Bank and
WHO) followed by aggressive marketing with promotional efforts aimed at children and
young people (Yurekli and De Beyer 2002, Bilir et al. 2009). These observations are
consistent with industry document evidence of intensive marketing and the importance of
young, female smokers to the TTCs (Lawrence 2008). Such efforts contrasted with the
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previous state monopoly era and were associated with rises in consumption and prevalence
(Yurekli and De Beyer 2002, Bilir et al. 2009).
Importantly, and in contrast to SOTMs, the TTC’s approach to marketing seems
independent of the degree of competition in a market. Thus BAT planned and executed
(Gilmore, A.B. et al. 2006) aggressive marketing campaigns even in markets where it hoped
to, or had successfully established, private monopolies (Gilmore, A.B. et al. 2005, Gilmore,
A.B. et al. 2007b).
Cigarette prices
There has been little published work on the impact of privatisation on cigarette prices and
none assessing the impact of resulting price changes on consumption. What data exist
suggest that cigarette prices have fallen post-privatisation. Work in Russia and Ukraine
shows that cigarette prices fell by some 30% to 50% in real terms between 2000 and 2006/7
(Ross et al. 2008, Ross et al. 2009). This was a period in which these economies, having
collapsed during the 1990s, were starting to grow again and thus incomes and the cost of
staples such as bread were rising. As a result, cigarettes have become more affordable (Ross
et al. 2008, Ross et al. 2009). Analyses from Turkey suggest real prices fell from 1987 to
2000 although these falls were almost exclusive to TTC’s brands as real prices of local
brands remained fairly stable (Onder 2002).
Such trends are consistent with evidence of the TTCs largely successful efforts to reduce
excise rates (see next section), their use of price discounting (Szilagyi and Chapman 2003b)
and smuggling, with evidence that the majority of TTC cigarette imports to the FSU in the
early 1990s were smuggled (Gilmore, A.B. and McKee 2004a, Gilmore, A. et al. 2007a).
Tobacco control policies
In addition to the flaunting of existing legislation, described above, literature from the
countries in which privatisation was examined shows that privatisation led to highly
effective lobbying against the introduction of new tobacco control measures (Szilagyi and
Chapman 2003a, Gilmore, A.B. and McKee 2004a, Gilmore, A.B. et al. 2006), with TTCs
focusing on preventing advertising restrictions, reducing excise rates and shaping excise
policy (Zatonksi 2003, Gilmore, A.B. and McKee 2004c, McKenzie et al. 2004, Szilagyi
and Chapman 2004, Gilmore, A.B. et al. 2006, Gilmore, A. et al. 2007a). In Uzbekistan, for
example, BAT, having already reversed an advertising ban in the capital, Tashkent,
overturned potentially highly effective national legislation which, inter alia, banned
cigarette advertising and smoking in public places, having the advertising ban replaced with
an ineffective voluntary code (Gilmore, A.B. et al. 2006). BAT also redesigned the Uzbek
tobacco taxation system to reinforce its monopoly, reduce competition and, ultimately, boost
sales earnings, securing, amongst other changes, a 50% reduction in cigarette excise rates
(Gilmore, A. et al. 2007a).
Although it could be argued that, as the largest single source of FDI (Gilmore, A.B. and
McKee 2004c), BAT may have enjoyed particularly strong leverage in Uzbekistan, other
evidence suggests TTC efforts to manage regulation were systematic. BAT established a
unit specifically to provide advice to recipient governments on tobacco excise regimes
(Gilmore, A.B. and McKee 2004b) and attempted to influence tax policy wherever it sought
to invest, with documented attempts in Hungary, Belarus, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and
Cambodia (Szilagyi and Chapman 2003b, McKenzie et al. 2004, Szilagyi and Chapman
2004, Gilmore, A. et al. 2007a). Other TTCs elsewhere obtained similar concessions as
condition of investment (Szilagyi and Chapman 2003a, Szilagyi and Chapman 2003b,
Zatonksi 2003, Gilmore, A. et al. 2007a). Collaboration among TTCs to promote voluntary
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advertising codes as a means of avoiding more stringent legislation has been documented in
Russia, Ukraine, Hungary and Cambodia (Szilagyi and Chapman 2003a, McKenzie et al.
2004, Szilagyi and Chapman 2004, Gilmore, A.B. et al. 2006) and the reversal of a Soviet
decree banning tobacco advertising appears to have been a precondition for the deal by RJ
Reynolds and Philip Morris to import 34 billion cigarettes to the Soviet Union in the early
1990s (Gilmore, A.B. et al. 2006). Poland’s example, however, illustrates that the industry’s
capacity to fashion policy is not absolute. As elsewhere, privatisation was initially followed
by weakened tobacco control, with lower tax rates and weakened advertising restrictions
offered as concessions to TTCs (Zatonksi 2003). But when this adversely affected smoking
trend in the early 1990s -- the previous decline in smoking prevalence halted, the percentage
of occasional smokers and young female smokers increased (Zatonksi 2003) – Poland,
unlike other countries in transition, responded rapidly, implementing a series of tobacco
control measures (Zatonksi 2003, Zatonski 2004). Another complex example is Turkey.
Although it is clear that, following market entry in 1993, the TTCs both undermined existing
legislation and lobbied to obstruct new tobacco control legislation, their lobbying was not
always successful and policies did progress most notably with the launch of the National
Strategy for Tobacco Control in December 2007 (Lawrence 2008, Bilir et al. 2009, Yurekli
and De Beyer 2002). Shortly preceding the privatisation of Tekel in June 2008, this
development reflects the strong domestic advocacy for tobacco control (Bilir et al. 2009).
Cigarette consumption
Although detailed econometric analyses of the impacts of privatisation have not yet been
undertaken due, in the FSU at least, to the complexity of interpreting economic data during
periods of rapid inflation, the introduction of new currencies and redenomination of old ones
(Gilmore, A.B. and McKee, 2005), one study published on the FSU (Gilmore, A.B. and
McKee 2005) and another unpublished report on Turkey and Ukraine (Yurekli and De Beyer
2002), suggest that privatisation/FDI increases consumption. From historic lows in the early
1990s, immediately prior to privatisation, cigarette consumption grew rapidly in the FSU
with increases concentrated in countries where TTCs invested: between 1991 and 2000, an
increase in per capita consumption of 56% occurred in the seven countries receiving early
investments, whilst a fall of 1% was seen in the five countries that remained without
investment (see Figure 3) (Gilmore, A.B. and McKee 2005). Although differences in the
volume of smuggling between these two groups of countries may have been substantial, they
are unlikely to account for differences in consumption of this magnitude. Increases of this
order seen both in the FSU (Gilmore, A.B. and McKee 2005) and Turkey (Yurekli and De
Beyer 2002) at a time of major economic recession is remarkable. So too is the fact that
consumption increased in Turkey despite robust tobacco control policies, seemingly in large
part attributable to the TTCs willingness to circumvent them.
Smoking prevalence—The most important evidence of a positive association between
privatisation and prevalence comes from a large Russian longitudinal study which reveals a
doubling in smoking prevalence among women, from 7% to 15% between 1992 (the year
the TTCs first invested) and 2003, and a significant increase from 57% to 63% among men
(Perlman et al. 2007). Although a previous study based on repeat surveys of smaller size
failed to reach such clear conclusions (Bobak et al. 2006), evidence from Ukraine, where
TTC investment occurred from 1992 to 1998, (again based on repeat and not always
identical surveys) recorded similar increases in prevalence between 2001 and 2005 (from
12% to 20% in women and 55% to 67% in men) (Andreeva and Krasovsky 2007). One other
study assessed trends between 1994 and 1998 in Estonia (TTC investment in 1993) and
Lithuania (first TTC investment in 1993), identifying a significant increase in female and
male smoking in Lithuania although the latter was not significant once confounders were
adjusted for (Puska et al. 2003). Comparison with historical data going back to the 1970s,
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available only for Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, also suggests marked increases in smoking
amongst women (Gilmore, A. 2005). Clearly, privatisation was taking place at a time of
major societal change, but it is noteworthy that wherever it has been studied, the increases in
female smoking were concentrated among young women in large cities, who were most
intensively targeted by the new entrants to the market.
Other surveys provide additional evidence of the impacts of privatisation on smoking habits.
A 2001 survey of eight FSU countries identifies key differences in smoking patterns
between countries receiving early TTC investments (or in the case of Belarus, treated by the
TTCs as though it had) and those that did not (either receiving no investment or late
investment) (Gilmore, A. et al. 2004, Pomerleau et al. 2004). The former had significantly
(at least 25-fold) higher rates of smoking among the youngest compared with the oldest
women, highly suggestive of an increase in female smoking over time. Lower ages of
smoking initiation was seen in both this survey, for both genders (Gilmore, A. et al. 2004),
and in the Russian longitudinal study for women (Perlman et al.2007). Finally numerous
surveys identify urban residence as the most important determinant of female smoking in
transition countries post-privatisation (Pudule et al. 1999, Gilmore, A.B. et al. 2001a,
Gilmore, A.B. et al. 2001b, Pomerleau et al. 2004), and trends in the urban/rural gradient
over time are entirely consistent with the targeted TTC marketing and distribution strategies
detailed above (Perlman et al. 2007).
Discussion
Summary
Most work on tobacco industry privatisation has concentrated on its health rather than
economic impacts, with a geographic focus on the FSU and Eastern Europe. Although there
was limited evidence from Turkey and Cambodia, other countries, including those in
Western Europe, did not feature in the literature (other than an unpublished thesis on Austria
which was not included for reasons given above). Much of the literature is also descriptive
in nature, either describing policy developments or analysing the TTC’s own documents in
order to understand industry behaviour. There are no studies formally assessing the
economic impacts of tobacco industry privatisation, few systematically explore impacts on
consumption or prevalence over a broad range of countries or link the trends observed with
changes in ownership.
Nevertheless, this review identifies several important issues. First, it suggests that tobacco
industry privatisation poses a major threat to public health. It appears to increase cigarette
consumption and smoking prevalence, especially among young women in urban areas.
These increases are associated with major increases in marketing (some specifically targeted
at groups with previously low smoking rates), improved distribution, and lower taxes/prices.
Increases in female and youth smoking and the fall in age of initiation all signal additional
demand for cigarettes created among new smokers and illustrate how TTCs successfully
target previously untapped segments of the market. Moreover, marketing appears to occur
regardless of the degree of competition in a market. Privatisation also transforms the policy
environment because TTCs ignore existing tobacco control policies and undermine
implementation of new ones. These impacts all appear to be driven by the for-profit motive
of privately owned tobacco companies and underline key differences in behaviour between
state and privately owned tobacco companies.
Second, despite the limited economic evaluations, the evidence suggests the economic
benefits of privatisation may be lower than commonly supposed. It is clear that TTCs
reduced potential government revenue by avoiding competitive tendering, negotiating
investment incentives, directing the smuggling of cigarettes and reducing excise rates.
Gilmore et al. Page 9
Glob Public Health. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2012 September 1.
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
Limited evidence also suggests privatisation has not benefitted the balance of trade or
employment in tobacco. Furthermore, given evidence that tobacco control is good for a
country’s economy (World Bank 1999), the weakening in tobacco control observed, with
obvious implications for future health burdens, will have additional negative economic
consequences. In short, therefore, the major beneficiaries in this process appear to be the
tobacco companies and their shareholders.
Weaknesses and strengths—This review faces the inevitable problems of
differentiating the effects of privatisation from those of other reforms undertaken
simultaneously, such as price and trade liberalisation, and of ascertaining whether between
country differences are genuinely attributable to privatisation. We attempted to reduce this
possibility by excluding papers that evaluated changes in countries where tobacco industry
privatisation followed trade liberalisation as, given what is already known about the impacts
of trade liberalisation, this could skew the results. Nevertheless, this remains a potential
issue as much of the evidence obtained focuses on the FSU where tobacco industry
privatisation was accompanied by more general and substantial political and market reforms.
Publication bias is also a possibility as papers finding no impacts of privatisation may be
less likely to be published.
It is possible, for example, that the impacts of tobacco industry privatisation in the FSU were
exacerbated by the economic and political disruption, coincident with TTC entry, which
likely left governments, focused on state-building and economic reform, unable to prioritise
tobacco control. Lack of experience in dealing with powerful corporate lobbying, weak civil
society and, in many countries, little real democracy or press freedom would likely have
accentuated this. Many of these factors do, however, apply (in various combinations) to
many low and middle income countries which could face tobacco industry privatisation in
the future. The fact that industry influence occurred in countries such as Hungary and
Poland, developing from fundamentally different positions (the countries had been longer
established, democratisation had been more successful, FDI was not concentrated in
tobacco, etc.), also suggests that policy influence can occur across a range of jurisdictions.
Moreover, increases in consumption were seen also in Turkey, seemingly regardless of the
strength of pre-existing policies. In fact, the consistency of our findings both across
countries and qualitative and quantitative evaluations constitute key strengths of this review.
The only data obtained from Western Europe covered Austria but was excluded from our
review as Austria joined the EU just prior to privatisation, making it difficult to disentangle
the impacts. Nevertheless it is noteworthy that from 1997/8 (privatisation occurred in 1997)
an abrupt increase in sales of over 20% was seen, reversing a 20 year decline (Bachinger
2004), suggesting that similar impacts might be seen in the west. Unsurprisingly, given that
both involve the entry of TTCs to new markets, our results are also remarkably consistent
with evidence on the impacts of trade liberalisation which indicates that it stimulates
cigarette consumption and smoking prevalence through increases in marketing and
reductions in price, with the largest increases in smoking occurring in young people and
women (Chaloupka and Laixuthai 1996, Chaloupka and Nair 2000a, Honjo and Kawachi
2000, Sato et al. 2000, Taylor and Chaloupka 2000, Hsu et al. 2005).
Validity of arguments for tobacco industry privatisation
This analysis raises serious questions about the validity of two arguments for tobacco
industry privatisation – first that it contributes to economic growth, and second, that by
taking the sale of tobacco out of state control it creates a policy environment more
conducive to tobacco control. A major weakness in such arguments is the overreliance on
Poland as an example of the benefits of privatisation on tobacco control (Chaloupka and
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Nair 2000b). Poland, in our view, is a rare exception. Whilst it is correct that privatisation
preceded improvements in tobacco control in Poland, it is incorrect to assume that
improvements occurred as a direct result of a change in ownership. In fact, tobacco control
weakened in Poland immediately following privatisation, and it was only when the
consequences of this became apparent that political action was taken (Zatonksi 2003). A
similar response to TTC entry was seen in Thailand and Taiwan in the 1980s and in Turkey
in the 2000s – the increase in cigarette consumption and the way TTC marketing
undermined existing policies stimulated efforts to strengthen tobacco control despite
continued government ownership of the tobacco industry. The key variable explaining
improved tobacco control post-privatisation in Poland does not, therefore, seem to be the
change in ownership but that public health professionals were sufficiently organised and
knowledgeable about tobacco control in advance of TTC entry and could, as a result of
meaningful democratisation, influence policy makers (Zatonksi 2003, Zatonski 2004).
The significance TTCs attached to maintaining an unrestricted marketing environment
suggests, not surprisingly, that marketing around the time of privatisation is key to creating
new smokers. The massive increase in marketing appeared to occur regardless of the
underlying market structure. This implies that it is not the presence of competition per se,
which drives marketing activity, but the earnings focus of privately owned TTCs. Our
findings thus suggest that the pressure to optimise returns to shareholders creates a far more
powerful force for driving changes in marketing practices and health policy than the
requirement to generate revenue for the state.
Indeed, the very different behaviour of state and privately owned companies is a crucial
finding of this review. In their quest for profits TTCs advertise extensively where SOTMs
did not. TTCs target marketing to create demand amongst groups with low levels of
smoking previously ignored by SOTMs. TTCs circumvent existing legislation and work
assiduously to overturn unfavourable legislation and create new favourable legislation in
ways that SOTMs did not. Thus, in shifting ownership to the private sector, privatisation
augments both the capacity and motivation of the supplier to increase production and
marketing and dilute the impact of regulation. In other words, who supplies tobacco
products is central to tobacco control. This point, that private ownership of tobacco
companies seriously constrains tobacco control because such organisations will always try to
undermine tobacco control measures in their drive for profit, has previously been made
(Callard et al. 2005a, Callard et al. 2005b).
We do not, however, suggest that state ownership is a panacea for tobacco control. It is not.
We simply argue that the evidence suggests privatisation is damaging to public health and,
therefore, alternatives to privatisation should be explored as outlined below.
Implications for research and policy
Further research should be conducted in a broader group of countries, including comparisons
of countries that have and have not undertaken privatisation of SOTMs, to elucidate more
precisely the impacts of privatisation on consumption, smoking prevalence, the economy
and society. Nevertheless, we believe there is now sufficient evidence for the IMF to
exclude tobacco from investment agreements and lists of state owned enterprises
recommended for privatisation. The example of the Thai Tobacco Monopoly suggests that
SOTMs can operate reasonably efficiently and profitably. Moreover, despite the growing
competitive pressures within that market, the Thai Tobacco Monopoly has yet to contest
Thailand’s robust tobacco control measures in the way that TTCs have (Vateesatokit et al.
2000, MacKenzie et al. 2004) and political economists suggest that privatisation could
threaten existing tobacco controls (Chantornvong and McCargo 2001). Where there is
greater pressure for reform, consideration should instead be given to how tobacco industry
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restructuring can be achieved without privatisation.(Gilmore, A. 2005) For example, the
assets of existing state-owned monopolies might be transferred to a not-for-profit company
with legal duties to achieve efficiency savings which are not transferred to the consumer in
reduced costs but are instead used to improve tobacco control and drive down consumption.
A variety of similar proposals for restructuring or strictly regulating the supply of tobacco
have been made but most work from the assumption that this will require restructuring or
regulating privately owned companies (Borland, 2003, Callard et al. 2005a, Callard et al.
2005b, Sugarman 2008). Applying these models to SOTMs would not only be easier
(precluding the need, for example, to buy out a TTC), but also provide an alternative to
privatisation. It should be noted that these models have yet to be applied in practice and,
therefore, careful implementation and evaluation of outcomes would be required. We also
recognise that the practicalities would be context specific, and in countries where the state-
owned company is already in competition with TTCs, success would be more likely where
effective tobacco control policies and good systems of governance were already in place.
The ratification of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), which outlines
a set of effective tobacco control policies that all 166 parties to the convention should now
implement, could be vital in this regard (World Health Organisation 2003).
Meanwhile, where tobacco industry privatisation does occur, measures can be taken to help
ensure that benefits to the public and governments are maximised, and risks to public health
are minimised (see Box 1). Recommendations to such effect have been made since 2003
(Gilmore, A. 2003, Gilmore, A.B. and McKee 2004b, Gilmore, A.B. et al. 2006, Gilmore,
A. et al. 2007a) and include 2005 World Bank good practice guidelines (World Bank 2005)
but do not yet appear to have been acted upon. Evidence from this paper also suggests that
these measures can only be achieved in the presence of strict regulation of TTC conduct.
The latter could be addressed, at least in part, through Article 5.3 of the FCTC, which aims
to reduce the inappropriate influence of the tobacco industry on policy (Conference of the
Parties to the FCTC, 2008). In the words of the World Bank, ‘Bank and IMF economists
who work on tobacco privatisation need to be as concerned about the government’s ability
to regulate as economists who work on telecommunications privatisation must be about
creating a regulatory and policy function within the government’ (World Bank 2005).
Box 1
Measures that should be taken to protect countries against the negative
impacts of tobacco industry privatisation include
1. ensuring that privatisation is preceded by effective tobacco control legislation
including comprehensive advertising restrictions, effective excise policies and
controls on smuggling;
2. ensuring that tobacco control legislation includes effective and easily
implemented enforcement policies, including high and fiscally significant fines
for violation;
3. ensuring that privatisation deals include agreements that prevent the TTCs from
rolling back legislation that has already been put in place;
4. conducting a health impact assessment (HIA) of the proposed privatisation in
order to assess the likely short and long-term health and economic impacts, to
identify danger points and mitigate their impact; and
5. increasing the transparency of privatisation processes and agreements, perhaps
through an independent third party, so that ‘deals’ that may undermine
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economic policy (such as deals to extend profit tax holidays or ensure monopoly
status) are avoided.
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Figure 1.
Cigarette Production in the USSR/FSU, 1960–2001
Source: USDA data, Figure taken from Gilmore, A.B. and McKee (2005). Note:2001 data
are estimates.
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Figure 2.
Tobacco leaf imports, USSR/FSU 1960 to 1999 (in metric tons)
Source: UN FAO Agricultural food and trade database, taken from Gilmore, A.B. and
McKee (2005).
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Figure 3.
Cigarette consumption per capita in the USSR/FSU (all ages), 1960–2001
Source: Cigarette consumption -USDA data. Population data -UN data to 1989, WHO data
from 1990. Adapted from Gilmore, A.B. and McKee(2005). Note:2001 data are estimates.
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at
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 p
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 p
ri
va
tis
at
io
n5
Se
rb
ia
 (E
ur
op
e)
20
03
Le
ad
in
g
Ph
ili
p 
M
or
ris
 (P
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 o
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) m
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at
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at
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 b
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ow
ne
rs
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0%
 o
f t
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st
ry
 o
r a
n 
as
se
t a
s a
 p
ro
xy
 fo
r c
on
tro
l.
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 d
at
a 
in
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is
 ta
bl
e 
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ve
 b
ee
n 
co
lla
te
d 
fr
om
 a
 n
um
be
r o
f d
iff
er
en
t s
ou
rc
es
, i
nc
lu
di
ng
: t
he
 M
ul
til
at
er
al
 In
ve
st
m
en
t G
ua
ra
nt
ee
 A
ge
nc
y’
s F
D
I d
at
ab
as
e 
(h
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://
w
w
w
.fd
i.n
et
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Eu
ro
m
on
ito
r, 
in
du
st
ry
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re
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re
le
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ul
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f c
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th
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, c
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ite
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st
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 d
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rti
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ca
de
m
ic
 re
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rts
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O
 p
ub
lic
at
io
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ls
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ire
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ta
 d
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ct
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in
an
ce
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ob
ac
co
 c
on
tro
l a
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oc
at
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ca
de
m
ic
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el
ls
 le
ft 
bl
an
k 
in
di
ca
te
 c
ou
nt
rie
s w
he
re
 th
er
e 
w
as
 n
o 
st
ud
y 
th
at
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
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cl
ud
ed
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n 
m
an
y 
ca
se
s s
ta
te
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w
ne
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ga
re
tte
 m
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uf
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tu
rin
g 
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pa
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 is
 p
riv
at
is
ed
 in
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ag
es
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at
is
at
io
n,
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s s
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h,
 c
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y 
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ar
s. 
W
e 
ha
ve
 ta
ke
n 
th
e 
da
te
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at
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ar
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 c
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ng
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 c
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at
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 b
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 p
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 c
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 b
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m
al
l u
ni
ts
 o
cc
ur
s i
n 
ad
va
nc
e 
of
 fu
ll 
pr
iv
at
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at
io
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ga
rta
ba
c’
s d
ec
is
io
n 
to
 se
ll 
so
m
e 
of
 it
s l
os
s-
m
ak
in
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un
its
,
in
cl
ud
in
g 
tw
o 
ci
ga
re
tte
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ct
or
ie
s)
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nd
 th
e 
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at
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ill
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ta
in
s a
 c
on
tro
lli
ng
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te
re
st
 in
 th
e 
re
m
ai
ni
ng
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du
st
ry
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he
re
 a
re
 se
ve
ra
l m
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ho
ds
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f p
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at
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io
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ch
 w
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fin
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he
re
 a
s t
he
 tr
an
sf
er
 o
f s
ta
te
 o
w
ne
d 
as
se
ts
 to
 p
riv
at
e 
ow
ne
rs
hi
p 
or
 c
on
tro
l).
 T
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s c
ol
um
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ei
th
er
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es
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m
et
ho
d 
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re
ct
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iv
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 c
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et
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 d
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m
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al
 b
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ef
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ef
ic
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s w
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n 
m
ul
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ss
et
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e 
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ld
 se
pa
ra
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ly
) o
f a
 c
om
pe
tit
iv
e 
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d 
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 n
on
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om
pe
tit
iv
e 
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 o
r t
ra
ns
fe
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C
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pa
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 d
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t o
w
ne
rs
 w
he
re
 o
w
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 c
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s b
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 N
ab
is
co
 a
nd
 G
al
la
he
r b
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n 
Ja
pa
n,
 K
or
ea
 a
nd
 T
ai
w
an
 p
riv
at
is
at
io
n 
fo
llo
w
ed
 tr
ad
e 
lib
er
al
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at
io
n,
 w
he
re
as
 in
 It
al
y 
an
d 
Fr
an
ce
 (1
95
7)
, S
pa
in
 a
nd
 P
or
tu
ga
l (
19
86
) a
nd
 A
us
tri
a 
(1
99
5)
 p
riv
at
is
at
io
n 
oc
cu
rr
ed
 a
fte
r t
he
ir 
ac
ce
ss
io
n 
to
 th
e
EU
.
N
O
TE
: D
at
a 
on
 p
riv
at
is
at
io
n 
is
 d
iff
ic
ul
t t
o 
co
lla
te
 n
ot
 le
as
t b
ec
au
se
 in
 m
an
y 
co
un
tri
es
 th
e 
pr
iv
at
is
at
io
n 
pr
oc
es
s m
ay
 n
ot
 b
e 
op
en
 to
 p
ub
lic
 sc
ru
tin
y 
an
d 
th
us
 a
ss
es
si
ng
 th
e 
ex
ac
t d
at
e 
an
d 
m
et
ho
d 
of
pr
iv
at
is
at
io
n 
an
d 
ch
an
ge
 in
 sh
ar
e 
ow
ne
rs
hi
p 
ca
n 
be
 d
iff
ic
ul
t. 
Th
e 
da
ta
 in
 th
is
 ta
bl
e 
ha
ve
 b
ee
n 
co
lla
te
d 
to
 th
e 
be
st
 o
f o
ur
 a
bi
lit
y 
fr
om
 n
um
er
ou
s s
ou
rc
es
 w
hi
ch
 w
er
e 
tri
an
gu
la
te
d.
 W
he
re
 d
at
a 
w
er
e 
no
t g
iv
en
 o
r
w
er
e 
co
nf
lic
tin
g,
 a
nd
 th
er
e 
w
as
 n
o 
ob
vi
ou
s m
et
ho
d 
fo
r a
ss
es
si
ng
 th
e 
re
la
tiv
e 
st
re
ng
th
s o
f t
he
 d
at
a,
 th
is
 is
 st
at
ed
.
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